Stanford endowment
Stanford University endowment policy portfolio (Stanford Management Company, Merged Pool targets 2023)
Where it stands today
Our calculation, 1984-02 – 2026-09
Growth of $10,000
Where it came from
Stanford Management Company was created by Stanford University in 1991 to manage the university's financial and real estate assets; before that the university treasurer's office did it internally. SMC is a division of the university governed by a board appointed by the Board of Trustees, and that board approves the asset-allocation targets (FY2009 annual financial review). Most of the endowment sits in the Merged Pool, an investment pool that also holds other long-term university funds. The Merged Pool was valued at about $14.5 billion at 30 June 2009 and $47.7 billion at 30 June 2025 (AI-CIO report on fiscal 2025), and the university endowment stood at about $40.8 billion at 31 August 2025 (Stanford Daily).
Policy portfolio. Each June SMC and its board re-examine the strategic asset-allocation targets, expected risk, return and correlations. The Merged Pool is built on modern portfolio theory and strategic asset allocation, with external managers doing the picking, and rebalanced towards the targets as markets move (Wallace, 2024 interview as reported by Top1000funds and AI-CIO). The 2009 FY report prints a table of 'long-term policy targets' as of 30 June 2009: public equity 37%, real estate 16%, private equity 12%, natural resources 7%, absolute return 18%, fixed income 10%.
Change since 2009. SMC's own 'Asset Class Overview' (version dated 2023, still linked on the SMC resources page in October 2026) gives the current targets: domestic equity 8%, international equity 16%, private equity 38%, real assets (real estate and natural resources) 10%, absolute return 19%, and fixed income plus cash 9%, together 100%. Private equity moved from 12% in 2009 to 38%, which is the largest shift. AI-CIO reported a 2020 mix of 30% private equity, 20% absolute return, 20% international equity, 8% real estate, 8% fixed income and cash, 7% domestic equity and 7% natural resources. Stanford's equity-oriented classes (public equity, private equity, real assets) add up to about 70% of the portfolio, as CEO Robert Wallace described it in 2024; absolute return and fixed income are the two non-equity classes.
A newer version of the Asset Class Overview (dated 8 October 2025) is indexed by search engines and, in the snippet I could see, puts international equity at 15% instead of 16%, while domestic equity is still 8%. I could not open that PDF (the address returns an error from this machine), so the other 2025 targets are unknown. This file therefore uses the full 2023 table and treats the 2025 change as a flagged difference of one point.
Why Stanford, not Princeton or MIT. SMC publishes policy targets for every asset class on its own website, in a primary document, which Harvard no longer does (see m_harvard); the other options in the brief were therefore not needed. Stanford is also a clear contrast with Harvard: far more private equity and absolute return, almost no bonds. Stanford's FY2009 crisis loss was 25.9% in the Merged Pool for the 12 months to 30 June 2009 (against -26.2% for the S&P 500 total return and -13.3% for a 60/40 mix, per the same report).
What is in it
| Domestic equity | 8% | Active and passive; 2023 target (2025 overview snippet also says 8%) |
| International equity (developed and emerging) | 16% | 2023 target; the 8 Oct 2025 overview reportedly says 15% (not opened) |
| Private equity (venture, growth, buyouts) | 38% | 2023 target; was 12% in 2009 and 30% in 2020 (AI-CIO) |
| Real assets (real estate and natural resources) | 10% | 2023 target; split between real estate and natural resources is not published in this document |
| Absolute return (long/short equity, relative value, distressed, special situations) | 19% | 2023 target; SMC expects equity beta of 0.3 or lower over most 5-year periods |
| Fixed income and cash (US Treasuries) | 9% | 2023 combined target; the document says fixed income is made of US Treasuries |
How we model it
| US small companies | 38% |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 13.7% |
| Short-term government bonds | 13.3% |
| Developed markets outside the US | 12% |
| Intermediate government bonds (10 y) | 9% |
| Real estate (REITs) | 7% |
| Emerging markets | 4% |
| Commodities | 3% |
For a euro investor
How to build it with European funds
| Part | Share | Example funds (ISIN) |
|---|---|---|
| US small companies | 38% | SPDR Russell 2000 U.S. Small Cap UCITS ETF IE00BJ38QD84iShares MSCI USA Small Cap ESG Enhanced CTB UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B3VWM098 |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 13.7% | iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09 |
| Short-term government bonds | 13.3% | iShares USD Treasury Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4S71iShares Euro Government Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4Q57 |
| Developed markets outside the US (closest match) | 12% | iShares Core MSCI Europe UCITS ETF EUR (Acc) IE00B4K48X80iShares Core MSCI Japan IMI UCITS ETF IE00B4L5YX21 |
| Intermediate government bonds (10 y) | 9% | iShares USD Treasury Bond 7-10yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B1FZS798 |
| Real estate (REITs) | 7% | iShares US Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZSF77iShares Developed Markets Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZS350 |
| Emerging markets | 4% | iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets IMI UCITS ETF (Acc) IE00BKM4GZ66 |
| Commodities | 3% | iShares Diversified Commodity Swap UCITS ETF IE00BDFL4P12 |
The idea
A perpetual university with no near-term need to sell can hold mostly illiquid, higher-expected-return assets and little in bonds. SMC says private equity offers the highest return and the highest risk in the pool, absolute return is meant to give low-correlation returns, real assets protect in inflationary periods, and Treasuries are held to keep value in deflationary or stressed periods and to provide liquidity. The aim, in SMC's words, is optimal long-term return for an appropriate level of risk, a steady payout to the operating budget and preserving purchasing power.
How people buy it
Not replicable by an individual: SMC invests through external managers (partnerships in private equity, real estate, natural resources and hedge funds) and a smaller internal team. Public proxies in this model: small-cap and global equity index funds, REIT funds, a short-bond fund and a Treasury fund.
Rebalancing as published
SMC and its board review the targets every June. Staff rebalance towards the targets as markets move, sometimes daily in volatile periods (Wallace, 2024, as reported by AI-CIO); illiquid classes can only drift and be adjusted through new commitments and distributions.
Variants
- 2009 policy targets (FY2009 review): public equity 37%, real estate 16%, private equity 12%, natural resources 7%, absolute return 18%, fixed income 10%.
- 2020 mix reported by AI-CIO: private equity 30%, absolute return 20%, international equity 20%, real estate 8%, fixed income and cash 8%, domestic equity 7%, natural resources 7%.
- 2025 overview: international equity 15% (snippet only); full table not seen.
- Other endowment models on this site: m_harvard (HMC, FY2013), m_swensen (Yale).
Criticism
- The portfolio cannot be copied by individuals: private equity, hedge funds and natural resources carry high fees, lockups and valuation smoothing.
- Liquidity stress in 2008-09: the FY2009 report says diversification failed to protect the pool from September 2008 to March 2009 when correlations rose and the pool had to meet university obligations from its liquid part.
- Private equity at 38% is a very concentrated bet on one illiquid asset class; policy weights moved from 12% to 38% in about 14 years, so the portfolio of 2009 and of 2023 are very different.
- Policy targets are the board's plan, not what the pool actually holds; actual weights drift and are not published in the documents I read.
Through the eras
| Era | Dates | Total | Per year | Worst drop | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black Monday | 1987-08 – 1987-12 | −18.3 % | — | −23.9 % | −21.8 % |
| Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession | 1990-07 – 1991-03 | +4.7 % | — | −14.1 % | +7.4 % |
| 1994 bond market massacre | 1994-02 – 1994-12 | −3.4 % | — | −5.4 % | −3.2 % |
| Asian and Russian financial crises | 1997-07 – 1998-10 | +3.1 % | +2.3 % | −17.6 % | +22.4 % |
| Dot-com bubble and crash | 2000-03 – 2002-10 | −12.5 % | −4.9 % | −15.2 % | −37.2 % |
| Recovery and housing boom | 2002-11 – 2007-09 | +120.2 % | +17.4 % | −4.7 % | +97.0 % |
| Global financial crisis | 2007-10 – 2009-03 | −35.9 % | −25.7 % | −41.7 % | −44.7 % |
| The decade after the crisis | 2009-04 – 2019-12 | +238.7 % | +12.0 % | −16.7 % | +411.2 % |
| Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off | 2018-09 – 2018-12 | −13.9 % | — | −13.9 % | −14.4 % |
| Covid crash and stimulus boom | 2020-02 – 2021-12 | +37.2 % | +18.0 % | −18.6 % | +53.6 % |
| Inflation shock and rate hikes | 2022-01 – 2022-12 | −15.2 % | −15.2 % | −19.6 % | −19.9 % |
Calendar years
Any N-year period
| Any N-year period | Worst | 10 % worse than | Median | 10 % better than | Best |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 y (501) | −35.6 % | −5.7 % | +11.8 % | +25.0 % | +56.9 % |
| 3 y (477) | −10.8 % | +2.4 % | +10.2 % | +15.6 % | +24.5 % |
| 5 y (453) | −2.0 % | +4.4 % | +9.5 % | +14.5 % | +20.3 % |
| 10 y (393) | +4.5 % | +6.5 % | +9.4 % | +12.1 % | +14.5 % |
| 15 y (333) | +5.9 % | +7.4 % | +9.0 % | +11.9 % | +13.2 % |
| 20 y (273) | +6.3 % | +7.6 % | +9.1 % | +11.2 % | +12.0 % |
| 30 y (153) | +8.1 % | +8.7 % | +9.3 % | +10.3 % | +11.0 % |
How it behaved in history
- 1991 founding of SMC. Stanford moved management of its endowment from the treasurer's office to a dedicated management company in 1991; the endowment was then under $2 billion according to a 2011 interview summary, and about $9 billion by 2000 (Wikipedia, unverified). en.wikipedia.org
- 2008-2009 financial crisis. Merged Pool lost 25.9% in the 12 months to June 2009, about the same as the S&P 500 and much more than a 60/40 mix, because the portfolio was equity-like (public and private equity, real estate, absolute return) and correlations jumped. bondholder-information.stanford.edu
- 2009 to 2023 policy shift. Private equity target rose from 12% to 38% and public equity fell from 37% to 24% (8 domestic + 16 international); fixed income stayed near 9-10%. smc.stanford.edu
- 2020 COVID year. AI-CIO reported that Stanford and Princeton each returned 5.6% in fiscal 2020 and gave the 2020 target mix (30% private equity, 20% absolute return, 20% international equity). www.ai-cio.com
Published results (by others)
- Merged Pool investment loss in the crisis year, against public markets (12 months to 30 Jun 2009): Merged Pool -25.9%; S&P 500 total return -26.2%; Barclays Aggregate +6.1%; 60/40 mix -13.3% bondholder-information.stanford.edu
- Ten-year annualised Merged Pool return at the end of FY2009 (10 years to 30 Jun 2009): 8.9% a year; pool grew from $5.8 billion to $14.5 billion bondholder-information.stanford.edu
- Endowment fell in FY2009 (FY2009): endowment down 27% to $12.6 billion; university investments down 24% bondholder-information.stanford.edu
- Recent year return (FY2025 (to 30 Jun 2025)): Merged Pool +14.3%; pool $47.7 billion; endowment $40.8 billion at 31 Aug 2025 (as reported) stanforddaily.com
What we could not verify
- The full 8 Oct 2025 version of the Asset Class Overview could not be opened (HTTP 404 from this machine); a search snippet gives international equity 15% and domestic equity 8%, the remaining 2025 targets are unknown. I used the 2023 table which sums to 100%.
- The AI-CIO article that repeats the 2023 weights and the 2020 mix could not be fetched directly (redirect); the 2020 mix and the 2025 fiscal return come from search summaries of AI-CIO and the Stanford Daily, so they are labelled medium confidence.
- The 2023 target table is from SMC's PDF; its exact issue date is not printed in the text I extracted, only 'currently targeted'.
- The split of real assets between real estate and natural resources, and of fixed income and cash, in 2023 is not published in this document; my mapping ratios are assumptions.
- The developed/emerging split of international equity is not published; 3:1 is my estimate.
- Wikipedia endowment sizes and the 1991 'under $2 billion' figure are secondary and not verified.
- The FY2008 return and the post-2009 annual returns were not collected.
Sources
- smc.stanford.edu
https://smc.stanford.edu/assets/Asset%20Class Overview 2023.pdf - smc.stanford.edu
https://smc.stanford.edu/resources/ - bondholder-information.stanford.edu
https://bondholder-information.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj21416/files/media/file/stanford-annual-financial-review-2009.pdf - www.ai-cio.com
https://www.ai-cio.com/news/stanfords-merged-pool-returns-14-3-in-fiscal-2025/ - www.ai-cio.com
https://www.ai-cio.com/news/stanford-princeton-endowments-return-5-6-2020/ - stanforddaily.com
https://stanforddaily.com/2025/10/16/stanford-reports-strong-investment-returns-ahead-of-federal-investment-tax-hike/ - www.top1000funds.com
https://www.top1000funds.com/investor-profile/robert-wallace-talks-strategy-execution-and-governance-at-stanford/ - en.wikipedia.org
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_University_endowment
Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.