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Stanford endowment

Stanford University endowment policy portfolio (Stanford Management Company, Merged Pool targets 2023)

Stanford Management Company (SMC) and its board; CEO and CIO Robert Wallace · SMC set up in 1991; policy targets re-set every June; table used here from SMC's 2023 Asset Class Overview

Live account on this site. This portfolio is also tracked here with a virtual $100,000 since 21.10.2026. Live account on this site →

Where it stands today

Data through 2026-09. Updated every month.

Since January+11.6 %
Last 12 months+14.5 %
Last 5 years, per year+6.7 %
Now below the peak−3.3 %
Place by 12 months8 / 60

Our calculation, 1984-02 – 2026-09

Per year9.8 %
Real (after inflation)6.8 %
Volatility12.5 %
Worst drop−41.7 %
Worst year−26.8 % (2008)
Best year36.2 %
Worst 12 months−35.6 %
Positive years80 %

2 % of this history is calculated with stand-ins for asset classes that did not exist yet (see “How we model it” and the page about data). Without stand-ins the history starts in 1990.

Growth of $10,000

$9,248$24,337$64,045$168,538$443,518$1,167,1441990200020102020
Stanford endowment: $543,480S&P 500: $1,163,109

Where it came from

Stanford Management Company was created by Stanford University in 1991 to manage the university's financial and real estate assets; before that the university treasurer's office did it internally. SMC is a division of the university governed by a board appointed by the Board of Trustees, and that board approves the asset-allocation targets (FY2009 annual financial review). Most of the endowment sits in the Merged Pool, an investment pool that also holds other long-term university funds. The Merged Pool was valued at about $14.5 billion at 30 June 2009 and $47.7 billion at 30 June 2025 (AI-CIO report on fiscal 2025), and the university endowment stood at about $40.8 billion at 31 August 2025 (Stanford Daily).

Policy portfolio. Each June SMC and its board re-examine the strategic asset-allocation targets, expected risk, return and correlations. The Merged Pool is built on modern portfolio theory and strategic asset allocation, with external managers doing the picking, and rebalanced towards the targets as markets move (Wallace, 2024 interview as reported by Top1000funds and AI-CIO). The 2009 FY report prints a table of 'long-term policy targets' as of 30 June 2009: public equity 37%, real estate 16%, private equity 12%, natural resources 7%, absolute return 18%, fixed income 10%.

Change since 2009. SMC's own 'Asset Class Overview' (version dated 2023, still linked on the SMC resources page in October 2026) gives the current targets: domestic equity 8%, international equity 16%, private equity 38%, real assets (real estate and natural resources) 10%, absolute return 19%, and fixed income plus cash 9%, together 100%. Private equity moved from 12% in 2009 to 38%, which is the largest shift. AI-CIO reported a 2020 mix of 30% private equity, 20% absolute return, 20% international equity, 8% real estate, 8% fixed income and cash, 7% domestic equity and 7% natural resources. Stanford's equity-oriented classes (public equity, private equity, real assets) add up to about 70% of the portfolio, as CEO Robert Wallace described it in 2024; absolute return and fixed income are the two non-equity classes.

A newer version of the Asset Class Overview (dated 8 October 2025) is indexed by search engines and, in the snippet I could see, puts international equity at 15% instead of 16%, while domestic equity is still 8%. I could not open that PDF (the address returns an error from this machine), so the other 2025 targets are unknown. This file therefore uses the full 2023 table and treats the 2025 change as a flagged difference of one point.

Why Stanford, not Princeton or MIT. SMC publishes policy targets for every asset class on its own website, in a primary document, which Harvard no longer does (see m_harvard); the other options in the brief were therefore not needed. Stanford is also a clear contrast with Harvard: far more private equity and absolute return, almost no bonds. Stanford's FY2009 crisis loss was 25.9% in the Merged Pool for the 12 months to 30 June 2009 (against -26.2% for the S&P 500 total return and -13.3% for a 60/40 mix, per the same report).

What is in it

Domestic equity8%Active and passive; 2023 target (2025 overview snippet also says 8%)
International equity (developed and emerging)16%2023 target; the 8 Oct 2025 overview reportedly says 15% (not opened)
Private equity (venture, growth, buyouts)38%2023 target; was 12% in 2009 and 30% in 2020 (AI-CIO)
Real assets (real estate and natural resources)10%2023 target; split between real estate and natural resources is not published in this document
Absolute return (long/short equity, relative value, distressed, special situations)19%2023 target; SMC expects equity beta of 0.3 or lower over most 5-year periods
Fixed income and cash (US Treasuries)9%2023 combined target; the document says fixed income is made of US Treasuries

Source of the shares: Stanford Management Company, Asset Class Overview (2023 version, PDF on the SMC resources page) — smc.stanford.edu. For each asset class the document says what it is and gives the Merged Pool target: domestic equity 8.0%, international equity 16.0%, private equity 38.0%, real assets 10.0%, absolute return 19.0%, fixed income and cash 9.0%. The 2009 targets (37/16/12/7/18/10) come from the FY2009 Stanford Annual Financial Review: https://bondholder-information.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj21416/files/media/file/stanford-annual-financial-review-2009.pdf

How we model it

US small companies38%
US large companies (S&P 500)13.7%
Short-term government bonds13.3%
Developed markets outside the US12%
Intermediate government bonds (10 y)9%
Real estate (REITs)7%
Emerging markets4%
Commodities3%

Same style as m_harvard. Domestic equity 8 -> us_large. International equity 16 -> intl_dev 12 and em 4 (3:1 split; my estimate, SMC does not publish the split). Private equity 38 -> us_small (public small caps as the usual stand-in for illiquid, leveraged small-company exposure; it is a poor proxy, because the real asset is unlisted, manager-selected and has valuation smoothing). Real assets 10 -> reit 7 and commodities 3 (the 2009 table split real estate and natural resources 16:7, so I used roughly that ratio; the 2023 split is not published, and Stanford's resources holdings are mainly private producers, not commodity futures). Absolute return 19 -> us_large 5.7 (equity beta 0.3 as stated by SMC) and bond_short 13.3 (low-risk remainder), which is an assumption like in m_harvard. Fixed income and cash 9 -> bond_mid 9 (SMC says the fixed income part is US Treasuries; the cash share is not published, so none is split out). Results of this proxy are NOT comparable with Stanford's reported returns: its private equity, hedge funds and natural resources cannot be bought as public index funds.

For a euro investor

The same portfolio bought with euros, without currency hedging: monthly returns converted at the end-of-month rate (German mark before 1999), inflation of the euro area. History in euros from 1984-02 to 2026-09.

Per year in euros8.6 %
After euro inflation6.3 %
Worst drop in euros−39.5 %
Worst year in euros−22.7 % (2002)
Safe withdrawal, 30 years, dollars6.76 % (1987-09)
Safe withdrawal, 30 years, euros5.10 % (1985-03)

The largest first-year withdrawal, then growing with inflation, that lasted 30 years from every monthly start. Test withdrawals for this portfolio →

How to build it with European funds

Examples of UCITS funds sold in the EU for each part of the portfolio. They track similar markets, not exactly the indices of our calculation.

PartShareExample funds (ISIN)
US small companies38%SPDR Russell 2000 U.S. Small Cap UCITS ETF IE00BJ38QD84
iShares MSCI USA Small Cap ESG Enhanced CTB UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B3VWM098
US large companies (S&P 500)13.7%iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087
Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09
Short-term government bonds13.3%iShares USD Treasury Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4S71
iShares Euro Government Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4Q57
Developed markets outside the US (closest match)12%iShares Core MSCI Europe UCITS ETF EUR (Acc) IE00B4K48X80
iShares Core MSCI Japan IMI UCITS ETF IE00B4L5YX21
Intermediate government bonds (10 y)9%iShares USD Treasury Bond 7-10yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B1FZS798
Real estate (REITs)7%iShares US Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZSF77
iShares Developed Markets Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZS350
Emerging markets4%iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets IMI UCITS ETF (Acc) IE00BKM4GZ66
Commodities3%iShares Diversified Commodity Swap UCITS ETF IE00BDFL4P12

These are examples, not recommendations. Check the fund's key information document, costs and taxes with your broker before buying. Names and ISINs checked on justETF on 4 November 2026; Udak receives nothing from these funds.

The idea

A perpetual university with no near-term need to sell can hold mostly illiquid, higher-expected-return assets and little in bonds. SMC says private equity offers the highest return and the highest risk in the pool, absolute return is meant to give low-correlation returns, real assets protect in inflationary periods, and Treasuries are held to keep value in deflationary or stressed periods and to provide liquidity. The aim, in SMC's words, is optimal long-term return for an appropriate level of risk, a steady payout to the operating budget and preserving purchasing power.

How people buy it

Not replicable by an individual: SMC invests through external managers (partnerships in private equity, real estate, natural resources and hedge funds) and a smaller internal team. Public proxies in this model: small-cap and global equity index funds, REIT funds, a short-bond fund and a Treasury fund.

Rebalancing as published

SMC and its board review the targets every June. Staff rebalance towards the targets as markets move, sometimes daily in volatile periods (Wallace, 2024, as reported by AI-CIO); illiquid classes can only drift and be adjusted through new commitments and distributions.

Variants

Criticism

Through the eras

EraDatesTotalPer yearWorst dropS&P 500
Black Monday1987-08 – 1987-12−18.3 %—−23.9 %−21.8 %
Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession1990-07 – 1991-03+4.7 %—−14.1 %+7.4 %
1994 bond market massacre1994-02 – 1994-12−3.4 %—−5.4 %−3.2 %
Asian and Russian financial crises1997-07 – 1998-10+3.1 %+2.3 %−17.6 %+22.4 %
Dot-com bubble and crash2000-03 – 2002-10−12.5 %−4.9 %−15.2 %−37.2 %
Recovery and housing boom2002-11 – 2007-09+120.2 %+17.4 %−4.7 %+97.0 %
Global financial crisis2007-10 – 2009-03−35.9 %−25.7 %−41.7 %−44.7 %
The decade after the crisis2009-04 – 2019-12+238.7 %+12.0 %−16.7 %+411.2 %
Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off2018-09 – 2018-12−13.9 %—−13.9 %−14.4 %
Covid crash and stimulus boom2020-02 – 2021-12+37.2 %+18.0 %−18.6 %+53.6 %
Inflation shock and rate hikes2022-01 – 2022-12−15.2 %−15.2 %−19.6 %−19.9 %

Calendar years

-27%36%1985: +28.0%1986: +12.6%1987: -2.1%1988: +17.4%1989: +20.5%1990: -8.8%19901991: +30.5%1992: +10.1%1993: +19.0%1994: +0.0%1995: +22.7%1996: +14.3%1997: +16.2%1998: +3.8%1999: +21.3%2000: +2.4%20002001: +2.4%2002: -8.0%2003: +36.2%2004: +15.8%2005: +9.1%2006: +16.5%2007: +5.0%2008: -26.8%2009: +26.6%2010: +19.1%20102011: -2.3%2012: +13.5%2013: +23.3%2014: +4.6%2015: -2.9%2016: +12.7%2017: +14.9%2018: -7.3%2019: +20.3%2020: +14.9%20202021: +17.0%2022: -15.2%2023: +14.2%2024: +9.3%2025: +13.2%

Any N-year period

Any N-year periodWorst10 % worse thanMedian10 % better thanBest
1 y (501)−35.6 %−5.7 %+11.8 %+25.0 %+56.9 %
3 y (477)−10.8 %+2.4 %+10.2 %+15.6 %+24.5 %
5 y (453)−2.0 %+4.4 %+9.5 %+14.5 %+20.3 %
10 y (393)+4.5 %+6.5 %+9.4 %+12.1 %+14.5 %
15 y (333)+5.9 %+7.4 %+9.0 %+11.9 %+13.2 %
20 y (273)+6.3 %+7.6 %+9.1 %+11.2 %+12.0 %
30 y (153)+8.1 %+8.7 %+9.3 %+10.3 %+11.0 %

How it behaved in history

Published results (by others)

What we could not verify

Sources

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Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.