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NZ Super 80/20

New Zealand Superannuation Fund Reference Portfolio (75% global equities, 5% NZ equities, 20% bonds, NZD-hedged)

Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation (the Crown entity that manages the NZ Super Fund); board decision, with staff authors of the 2015 review including Sue Brake, David Iverson, Joe Cheung and Chris Worthington · Reference Portfolio approach adopted around 2009-2010; first five-year review 2015; latest known review 2025/26

Live account on this site. This portfolio is also tracked here with a virtual $100,000 since 21.10.2026. Live account on this site →

Where it stands today

Data through 2026-09. Updated every month.

Since January+9.5 %
Last 12 months+12.7 %
Last 5 years, per year+8.9 %
Now below the peak−1.5 %
Place by 12 months18 / 60

Our calculation, 1926-07 – 2026-09

Per year9.2 %
Real (after inflation)6.0 %
Volatility14.7 %
Worst drop−74.4 %
Worst year−34.8 % (1931)
Best year46.5 %
Worst 12 months−54.8 %
Positive years75 %

34 % of this history is calculated with stand-ins for asset classes that did not exist yet (see “How we model it” and the page about data). Without stand-ins the history starts in 1990.

Growth of $10,000

$4,147$35,740$308,016$2,654,584$22,878,060$197,170,5081930194019501960197019801990200020102020
NZ Super 80/20: $66,532,859S&P 500: $196,488,890

Where it came from

The New Zealand Superannuation Fund was created by the NZ Government to put money aside now so that the future cost of national superannuation (the state pension) can be spread over time and the tax burden smoothed. It began investing in 2003 and is run by the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation. The mandate is to maximise return without undue risk, using best-practice portfolio management and without damaging New Zealand's reputation as a responsible member of the world community (2015 review). Because it has no direct liabilities and a very long horizon, the Guardians see a greater tolerance for equity risk than a typical investor.

The Reference Portfolio is not the Fund's real portfolio. The 2015 review describes it as a simple, low-cost, passive and static portfolio of traditional asset classes that could be implemented with index exposures. The real portfolio is allowed to differ from it by a wide margin: management decides on deviations within risk limits set by the board, and the Reference Portfolio acts as the benchmark against which those active decisions are judged. The Guardians say they have used this approach since 2010 (2015 review text; a trade-press article dates the launch to 2009, so the exact year is uncertain). Its stated design principles are: simple and low cost, passive, diversified, a risk level appropriate to the Fund's purpose, relevant to a New Zealand investor, and an equilibrium construct.

2010 composition: 70% developed-market global equities, 5% New Zealand equities, 5% global listed property and 20% global fixed interest (about 80% growth assets and 20% income assets). The 2015 review, completed in the first half of 2015, dropped the listed-property sleeve because the starting point became the liquid/listed universe, and split global equities into 65% developed and 10% emerging markets (the emerging share raised by about 3 points above free-float weights to approximate full market capitalisation). It kept 5% NZ equities, because of a ministerial directive to look for ways to increase New Zealand assets and the principle of diversification, and 20% global fixed interest. The expected return rose from NZ Treasury bills plus 2.5% to plus 2.7% a year, and the expected volatility from 13.2% to 13.5%.

2020 review (white paper published 20 January 2021): the 80/20 growth/income split and the 5% NZ equities were kept, developed and emerging equities were merged into a single global equities building block, and the 100% hedge to the New Zealand dollar was kept (modelling put the return-maximising hedge at 100% and the risk-minimising hedge at 90-100%). The Guardians expected a long-term return of 6.8% a year, 2.8 points above the estimated risk-free rate, and a volatility of 13.8%. Inflation-hedging strategies and commodities were considered and rejected. The long-run forecast had been 8.5% in 2010 and fell to 6.8% in 2020.

Latest review: a trade-press report of 20 September 2026 says the Guardians kept the Reference Portfolio settings of 75% global equities, 5% NZ shares and 20% international fixed income after the five-yearly review completed earlier in 2026. I did not find the Guardians' own publication of this review, so the 2025/26 result rests on that single secondary report, though it agrees with every earlier review. In the same article the Fund's provisional return for the 12 months to 30 June 2026 was 14.17% after costs against 14.27% for the Reference Portfolio.

What is in it

Global equities (developed and emerging, NZD-hedged)75%Reference Portfolio kept after the 2020 and the 2025/26 reviews; in 2015 the split was 65% developed and 10% emerging; in 2020 the two were merged into one block
New Zealand equities (NZX 50 Gross index)5%Unchanged since 2010
Global fixed interest (Bloomberg/Barclays Global Aggregate, hedged to NZD)20%Unchanged since 2010; inflation-linked bonds, high yield and EM local-currency debt excluded for cost reasons

Source of the shares: NZ Super Fund 2015 Reference Portfolio Review (July 2015); Guardians' news item on the 2020 review (21 Jan 2021); Investment News NZ report on the 2026 review — www.nzsuperfund.nz. The 2015 review prints a table of the 2010 and 2015 allocations (70/5/5/20 and 65 DM + 10 EM/5/0/20), the hedging reasoning (full hedge to NZD) and the benchmark indices (MSCI World IMI and MSCI Emerging Markets IMI hedged to NZD, NZX 50 Gross, Global Aggregate hedged to NZD). The 2020 news item confirms 80% growth and 20% fixed income with 5% NZ equities. The 2026 report (https://investmentnews.co.nz/investment-news/nz-super-shrugs-off-10bps-reference-miss-preps-for-different-times/) states the current settings of 75/5/20.

How we model it

US large companies (S&P 500)46%
Developed markets outside the US24%
US bond market (aggregate)20%
Emerging markets10%

Static 75/5/20 portfolio. Global equities (75) are split with the 2015 published 65 developed / 10 emerging: em = 0.10. The developed 65 is split between us_large and intl_dev using an assumed US share of about 70 percent of developed-market equity (my estimate of the MSCI World weight, not from the NZ documents): us_large about 0.46, intl_dev about 0.19. The 5% NZ equities are added to intl_dev (developed ex-US), giving intl_dev 0.24. Global fixed interest (20) is mapped to bond_agg (the US aggregate index) as the nearest class we have. Important differences: the real benchmark is fully hedged to the New Zealand dollar and measured in NZD, while our series are unhedged US-dollar returns; the equity indices are broad MSCI IMI indices that include small caps, not S&P 500; the bond index is global (ex-USD parts hedged), not US-only. The 2010 mix (70 global, 5 NZ, 5 listed property, 20 bonds) is not modelled.

For a euro investor

The same portfolio bought with euros, without currency hedging: monthly returns converted at the end-of-month rate (German mark before 1999), inflation of the euro area. History in euros from 1953-10 to 2026-09.

Per year in euros8.7 %
After euro inflation5.8 %
Worst drop in euros−51.9 %
Worst year in euros−29.9 % (1974)
Safe withdrawal, 30 years, dollars3.59 % (1929-09)
Safe withdrawal, 30 years, euros2.72 % (1968-12)

The largest first-year withdrawal, then growing with inflation, that lasted 30 years from every monthly start. Test withdrawals for this portfolio →

How to build it with European funds

Examples of UCITS funds sold in the EU for each part of the portfolio. They track similar markets, not exactly the indices of our calculation.

PartShareExample funds (ISIN)
US large companies (S&P 500)46%iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087
Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09
Developed markets outside the US (closest match)24%iShares Core MSCI Europe UCITS ETF EUR (Acc) IE00B4K48X80
iShares Core MSCI Japan IMI UCITS ETF IE00B4L5YX21
US bond market (aggregate) (closest match)20%iShares Core Global Aggregate Bond UCITS ETF EUR Hedged (Acc) IE00BDBRDM35
iShares Core Global Aggregate Bond UCITS ETF USD (Dist) IE00B3F81409
Emerging markets10%iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets IMI UCITS ETF (Acc) IE00BKM4GZ66

These are examples, not recommendations. Check the fund's key information document, costs and taxes with your broker before buying. Names and ISINs checked on justETF on 4 November 2026; Udak receives nothing from these funds.

The idea

A long-horizon fund with no direct liabilities can hold mostly equities, but the Guardians keep 20 percent in bonds for diversification. Global equities carry the main reward for risk, the 5 percent NZ equities respond to a government expectation to look for NZ opportunities, and all foreign currency is hedged to the NZD because the Guardians believe the NZD carries a risk premium (interest-rate differential) that rewards hedging and because hedging reduces risk only slightly. The Reference Portfolio is also a governance device: the board sets a simple benchmark and management is judged on how much value it adds to it.

How people buy it

The Guardians implement the Reference Portfolio with physical and synthetic index exposure inside their own fund; it is not a product for sale. For a private investor in NZD the nearest copy would be a global equity index fund (for example MSCI World IMI and EM funds), a small NZ equity index fund and a currency-hedged global aggregate bond fund, with currency forwards for hedging.

Rebalancing as published

The Reference Portfolio is static: weights stay fixed until the next review, which the Guardians do at least every five years (2015, 2020, 2025/26). The 2015 review gives no rebalancing frequency within the benchmark; the actual portfolio is allowed to deviate substantially from it.

Variants

Criticism

Through the eras

EraDatesTotalPer yearWorst dropS&P 500
Roaring Twenties boom1926-07 – 1929-08+118.9 %+28.1 %−4.7 %+153.7 %
Wall Street crash and Great Contraction1929-09 – 1932-07−68.3 %−32.6 %−74.4 %−78.2 %
New Deal recovery1932-08 – 1937-02+202.3 %+27.3 %−23.1 %+268.7 %
Recession within the Depression1937-03 – 1938-03−40.3 %−37.8 %−40.3 %−49.5 %
Rearmament and World War II1938-04 – 1945-09+157.4 %+13.4 %−22.6 %+205.8 %
Postwar expansion1945-10 – 1965-12+807.2 %+11.5 %−19.7 %+1212.9 %
Golden age of the 1950s1950-01 – 1959-12+308.5 %+15.1 %−11.2 %+438.8 %
Go-go years and nifty-fifty1966-01 – 1968-12+28.5 %+8.7 %−12.4 %+34.0 %
The Great Inflation (stagflation)1969-01 – 1982-07+94.3 %+5.0 %−38.0 %+84.6 %
1973-74 oil shock and bear market1973-01 – 1974-12−33.0 %−18.2 %−38.0 %−41.7 %
Second oil shock and the Volcker disinflation1979-01 – 1982-08+53.2 %+12.3 %−11.7 %+59.2 %
Great bull market in stocks and bonds1982-08 – 1999-12+1271.6 %+16.2 %−25.0 %+2060.4 %
Black Monday1987-08 – 1987-12−17.9 %—−25.0 %−21.8 %
Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession1990-07 – 1991-03+3.3 %—−14.7 %+7.4 %
1994 bond market massacre1994-02 – 1994-12−3.3 %—−5.8 %−3.2 %
Asian and Russian financial crises1997-07 – 1998-10+7.4 %+5.5 %−13.7 %+22.4 %
Dot-com bubble and crash2000-03 – 2002-10−28.0 %−11.6 %−33.6 %−37.2 %
Recovery and housing boom2002-11 – 2007-09+122.6 %+17.7 %−5.8 %+97.0 %
Global financial crisis2007-10 – 2009-03−37.0 %−26.5 %−43.1 %−44.7 %
The decade after the crisis2009-04 – 2019-12+239.9 %+12.1 %−15.3 %+411.2 %
Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off2018-09 – 2018-12−10.3 %—−10.4 %−14.4 %
Covid crash and stimulus boom2020-02 – 2021-12+33.8 %+16.4 %−16.2 %+53.6 %
Inflation shock and rate hikes2022-01 – 2022-12−17.2 %−17.2 %−23.3 %−19.9 %

Calendar years

-35%46%1927: +26.8%1928: +31.5%1929: -10.7%1930: -22.3%19301931: -34.8%1932: -5.7%1933: +46.5%1934: +3.8%1935: +36.8%1936: +26.2%1937: -27.1%1938: +23.4%1939: +2.8%1940: -4.9%19401941: -8.8%1942: +13.6%1943: +23.1%1944: +17.8%1945: +31.8%1946: -4.7%1947: +2.9%1948: +2.1%1949: +16.6%1950: +24.1%19501951: +16.9%1952: +11.1%1953: +1.6%1954: +40.9%1955: +20.1%1956: +6.2%1957: -6.6%1958: +35.6%1959: +9.7%1960: +3.3%19601961: +22.0%1962: -7.0%1963: +17.1%1964: +13.6%1965: +11.7%1966: -6.0%1967: +22.3%1968: +11.8%1969: -9.8%1970: +3.7%19701971: +15.1%1972: +14.0%1973: -14.8%1974: -21.4%1975: +31.8%1976: +24.6%1977: -2.4%1978: +6.5%1979: +19.1%1980: +26.4%19801981: -1.5%1982: +25.1%1983: +18.5%1984: +6.0%1985: +32.0%1986: +17.4%1987: +1.6%1988: +15.9%1989: +27.9%1990: -4.6%19901991: +25.1%1992: +2.7%1993: +23.2%1994: +0.7%1995: +22.1%1996: +12.8%1997: +14.6%1998: +14.9%1999: +26.7%2000: -10.2%20002001: -8.8%2002: -11.6%2003: +31.5%2004: +14.6%2005: +10.9%2006: +17.3%2007: +11.1%2008: -30.9%2009: +30.0%2010: +14.4%20102011: -3.1%2012: +14.3%2013: +21.3%2014: +5.5%2015: -1.1%2016: +8.6%2017: +21.1%2018: -7.0%2019: +22.7%2020: +16.9%20202021: +13.8%2022: -17.2%2023: +18.5%2024: +13.3%2025: +20.1%

Any N-year period

Any N-year periodWorst10 % worse thanMedian10 % better thanBest
1 y (1192)−54.8 %−9.0 %+12.1 %+28.8 %+113.6 %
3 y (1168)−34.2 %−1.9 %+10.0 %+18.6 %+36.2 %
5 y (1144)−13.9 %+1.9 %+9.6 %+16.0 %+28.4 %
10 y (1084)−2.7 %+4.3 %+9.0 %+14.3 %+17.4 %
15 y (1024)+1.0 %+5.9 %+9.3 %+13.8 %+16.5 %
20 y (964)+2.6 %+6.7 %+9.8 %+12.9 %+15.4 %
30 y (844)+7.0 %+8.4 %+9.9 %+11.4 %+12.6 %

How it behaved in history

Published results (by others)

What we could not verify

Sources

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Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.