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Merriman Ultimate 60/40

Paul Merriman Ultimate Buy and Hold (10 stock funds + bonds, 60/40 version)

Paul Merriman (Seattle fund manager and educator) · 1994-1995 (Merriman says he learned the ten-class framework in a Dimensional Fund Advisors class in 1994 and calls the portfolio the one 'we used to call' ultimate buy and hold thirty years ago; an older page of his site referred to a 1995 version with about 40% fixed income)

Live account on this site. This portfolio is also tracked here with a virtual $100,000 since 21.10.2026. Live account on this site →

Where it stands today

Data through 2026-09. Updated every month.

Since January+6.9 %
Last 12 months+9.9 %
Last 5 years, per year+5.6 %
Now below the peak−3.1 %
Place by 12 months32 / 60

Our calculation, 1926-07 – 2026-09

Per year8.9 %
Real (after inflation)5.7 %
Volatility12.4 %
Worst drop−63.5 %
Worst year−28.1 % (1931)
Best year51.9 %
Worst 12 months−44.4 %
Positive years76 %

32 % of this history is calculated with stand-ins for asset classes that did not exist yet (see “How we model it” and the page about data). Without stand-ins the history starts in 2000.

Growth of $10,000

$4,147$35,740$308,016$2,654,584$22,878,060$197,170,5081930194019501960197019801990200020102020
Merriman Ultimate 60/40: $49,735,608S&P 500: $196,488,890

Where it came from

Paul Merriman is a Seattle-based money manager and retirement educator who writes and teaches free investing courses at paulmerriman.com. The 'Ultimate Buy and Hold' portfolio is his broadest diversified mix: ten equally weighted stock asset classes spanning U.S. and international, large and small, blend and value stocks, emerging markets and REITs, plus bonds sized to the investor's risk tolerance.

His idea is that you spread money across as many well-researched stock classes as possible, tilt toward small and value stocks (which his historical data show beating the S&P 500 over long periods), and then adjust only the bond percentage to match the volatility you can tolerate. Portfolio Charts describes it the same way: equal weight to each stock asset, with the overall bond share set by desired volatility.

Merriman's own current page (the 2026 Boot Camp material) presents the portfolio as ten equity asset classes: five US (S&P 500, large-cap value, small-cap blend, small-cap value, REITs), four developed international (large blend, large value, small blend, small value) and emerging markets. He says the idea came from a 1994 class given by people from Dimensional Fund Advisors, who showed that ten equity classes had earned a premium for risk over 50 to 100 years of data. An older page of his site said the portfolio held about 40% fixed income in 1995 and closer to 30-35% by 2025; it now offers a simpler four-fund alternative (large blend, large value, small blend, small value, equal weights). Rob Berger notes a 2-fund version (small value and large value) as well; that two-fund version is the separate model m_merriman.

The bond sleeve in Merriman's version is 50% intermediate-term Treasuries, 30% short-term Treasuries and bills, and 20% short-term TIPS (Rob Berger); Portfolio Charts' 40%-bond example gives the same split (20% intermediate, 12% short-term, 8% short TIPS) but folds TIPS into short-term bonds because it lacked TIPS data.

Fund choices are updated yearly on Merriman's site; examples quoted in 2021 include Avantis and Vanguard/iShares ETFs (MoneyCrashers). We read Merriman's 2026 Boot Camp article and the 2026 tables, which describe only the equity part (the tables show 100 percent stock portfolios); his older pages on this portfolio now return 'not found'. The stock/bond split and the bond mix used here therefore come from Portfolio Charts and Rob Berger, not from a Merriman table, and the exact book source of the portfolio (his 2006-2008 books are likely, not verified) remains open.

What is in it

US large-cap blend (S&P 500)6%6% in the 60/40 version; 10% in the all-stock 50/50 table (14% in Merriman's 70/30 US/international table)
US large-cap value6%
US small-cap blend6%
US small-cap value6%
International large-cap blend (developed ex-US)6%
International large-cap value6%
International small-cap blend6%
International small-cap value6%
Emerging markets6%
REITs (US real estate)6%
Intermediate-term Treasury bonds20%50% of the bond sleeve (sleeve split per Rob Berger, not a Merriman table)
Short-term Treasury bonds12%30% of the bond sleeve
Short-term TIPS8%20% of the bond sleeve

Source of the shares: Merriman Financial Education Foundation: Boot Camp #2 'The Ultimate Buy and Hold Portfolio' and Tables A1a/A1b (2026) for the equity part; Portfolio Charts and Rob Berger for the 60/40 bond sleeve — www.paulmerriman.com. Merriman's table A1a (50 percent US / 50 percent international) gives ten equity classes at 10 percent each: S&P 500, US large value, US small blend, US small value, REITs, international large blend, large value, small blend, small value, and emerging markets. His table A1b (70 percent US / 30 percent international) uses 14 percent for each of the five US classes and 6 percent for each of the four international classes and emerging markets. The tables cover equities only (1970-2025, 100 percent stock). The 60/40 version used here takes six percent per class from the 50/50 table, and the bond sleeve (50 percent intermediate Treasuries, 30 percent short Treasuries and bills, 20 percent short TIPS) is the description of Rob Berger, who says the 60/40 table is his own derivation of Merriman's method, plus Portfolio Charts' 40 percent bond example with 8 percent short TIPS and 12 percent short-term bonds. Merriman's own 2026 pages give no stock-bond split for this portfolio.

How we model it

Developed markets outside the US24%
Intermediate government bonds (10 y)20%
Short-term government bonds12%
Inflation-protected bonds (TIPS)8%
US large companies (S&P 500)6%
US large value stocks6%
US small companies6%
US small value stocks6%
Emerging markets6%
Real estate (REITs)6%

The four international developed slices (large blend, large value, small blend, small value; 6% each) are all mapped to one intl_dev series (no value or small series abroad), so the international value and size tilt is lost; emerging markets blend -> em. US slices map directly: large blend -> us_large, large value -> us_large_value, small blend -> us_small, small value -> us_small_value. Short TIPS are mapped to tips (our series is broader than short TIPS). Our equal 6 percent slices equal Merriman's 50/50 US/international table (ten classes at 10 percent of stocks) scaled to a 60 percent stock share. His 70/30 table scaled to 60 percent stocks would be 8.4 percent for each US class (S&P 500, large value, small blend, small value, REITs), 3.6 percent for each of the four developed international classes and 3.6 percent for emerging markets, which here would give intl_dev 14.4 percent and em 3.6 percent.

For a euro investor

The same portfolio bought with euros, without currency hedging: monthly returns converted at the end-of-month rate (German mark before 1999), inflation of the euro area. History in euros from 1953-10 to 2026-09.

Per year in euros8.2 %
After euro inflation5.4 %
Worst drop in euros−44.8 %
Worst year in euros−24.2 % (1973)
Safe withdrawal, 30 years, dollars4.20 % (1968-12)
Safe withdrawal, 30 years, euros3.09 % (1968-12)

The largest first-year withdrawal, then growing with inflation, that lasted 30 years from every monthly start. Test withdrawals for this portfolio →

How to build it with European funds

Examples of UCITS funds sold in the EU for each part of the portfolio. They track similar markets, not exactly the indices of our calculation.

PartShareExample funds (ISIN)
Developed markets outside the US (closest match)24%iShares Core MSCI Europe UCITS ETF EUR (Acc) IE00B4K48X80
iShares Core MSCI Japan IMI UCITS ETF IE00B4L5YX21
Intermediate government bonds (10 y)20%iShares USD Treasury Bond 7-10yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B1FZS798
Short-term government bonds12%iShares USD Treasury Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4S71
iShares Euro Government Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4Q57
Inflation-protected bonds (TIPS)8%iShares USD TIPS UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B1FZSC47
US large companies (S&P 500)6%iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087
Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09
US large value stocks6%iShares Edge MSCI USA Value Factor UCITS ETF IE00BD1F4M44
US small companies6%SPDR Russell 2000 U.S. Small Cap UCITS ETF IE00BJ38QD84
iShares MSCI USA Small Cap ESG Enhanced CTB UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B3VWM098
US small value stocks6%SPDR MSCI USA Small Cap Value Weighted UCITS ETF IE00BSPLC413
Emerging markets6%iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets IMI UCITS ETF (Acc) IE00BKM4GZ66
Real estate (REITs)6%iShares US Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZSF77
iShares Developed Markets Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZS350

These are examples, not recommendations. Check the fund's key information document, costs and taxes with your broker before buying. Names and ISINs checked on justETF on 4 November 2026; Udak receives nothing from these funds.

The idea

Diversify as widely as possible by country, company size and valuation, tilt toward small and value stocks for higher long-run return, and use bonds only to dial volatility to a comfortable level.

How people buy it

Merriman's yearly ETF/fund list includes Avantis and Vanguard/iShares funds, e.g. AVUS, RPV, IJR, AVUV, VNQ, AVDE in 2021 (MoneyCrashers); Rob Berger mentions Vanguard small-cap (VB) and iShares micro-cap (IWC) as substitutes. Fund names change yearly; check Merriman's site.

Rebalancing as published

Rebalance annually: Merriman's tables show monthly rebalancing slightly lowering volatility but also long-term return (about 0.2 point a year for the ten-class mix, 1970-2025); Rob Berger makes the same point.

Variants

Criticism

Through the eras

EraDatesTotalPer yearWorst dropS&P 500
Roaring Twenties boom1926-07 – 1929-08+79.8 %+20.4 %−4.1 %+153.7 %
Wall Street crash and Great Contraction1929-09 – 1932-07−55.2 %−24.1 %−63.5 %−78.2 %
New Deal recovery1932-08 – 1937-02+179.7 %+25.2 %−25.7 %+268.7 %
Recession within the Depression1937-03 – 1938-03−35.4 %−33.2 %−36.1 %−49.5 %
Rearmament and World War II1938-04 – 1945-09+151.8 %+13.1 %−16.3 %+205.8 %
Postwar expansion1945-10 – 1965-12+597.6 %+10.1 %−16.7 %+1212.9 %
Golden age of the 1950s1950-01 – 1959-12+231.3 %+12.7 %−9.4 %+438.8 %
Go-go years and nifty-fifty1966-01 – 1968-12+35.9 %+10.8 %−10.4 %+34.0 %
The Great Inflation (stagflation)1969-01 – 1982-07+144.2 %+6.8 %−25.6 %+84.6 %
1973-74 oil shock and bear market1973-01 – 1974-12−22.3 %−11.8 %−25.5 %−41.7 %
Second oil shock and the Volcker disinflation1979-01 – 1982-08+57.2 %+13.1 %−10.4 %+59.2 %
Great bull market in stocks and bonds1982-08 – 1999-12+872.9 %+14.0 %−18.5 %+2060.4 %
Black Monday1987-08 – 1987-12−13.5 %—−18.5 %−21.8 %
Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession1990-07 – 1991-03+3.7 %—−12.2 %+7.4 %
1994 bond market massacre1994-02 – 1994-12−4.4 %—−5.1 %−3.2 %
Asian and Russian financial crises1997-07 – 1998-10+7.5 %+5.6 %−9.5 %+22.4 %
Dot-com bubble and crash2000-03 – 2002-10−3.0 %−1.1 %−8.8 %−37.2 %
Recovery and housing boom2002-11 – 2007-09+105.6 %+15.8 %−4.5 %+97.0 %
Global financial crisis2007-10 – 2009-03−27.2 %−19.1 %−33.1 %−44.7 %
The decade after the crisis2009-04 – 2019-12+160.9 %+9.3 %−10.6 %+411.2 %
Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off2018-09 – 2018-12−8.3 %—−8.3 %−14.4 %
Covid crash and stimulus boom2020-02 – 2021-12+24.2 %+12.0 %−12.8 %+53.6 %
Inflation shock and rate hikes2022-01 – 2022-12−13.2 %−13.2 %−18.9 %−19.9 %

Calendar years

-28%52%1927: +21.1%1928: +23.8%1929: -8.1%1930: -19.4%19301931: -28.1%1932: -1.3%1933: +51.9%1934: +2.6%1935: +30.1%1936: +26.1%1937: -22.4%1938: +18.5%1939: +0.3%1940: -3.0%19401941: -5.6%1942: +14.4%1943: +25.8%1944: +19.1%1945: +29.2%1946: -3.7%1947: +2.8%1948: +1.8%1949: +12.9%1950: +23.3%19501951: +11.3%1952: +8.8%1953: +0.5%1954: +35.6%1955: +15.2%1956: +3.9%1957: -5.9%1958: +32.9%1959: +8.8%1960: +2.4%19601961: +17.7%1962: -3.4%1963: +14.9%1964: +11.9%1965: +13.0%1966: -3.3%1967: +22.5%1968: +14.6%1969: -10.1%1970: +7.9%19701971: +13.6%1972: +9.4%1973: -10.3%1974: -13.4%1975: +27.9%1976: +27.1%1977: +3.4%1978: +6.6%1979: +18.3%1980: +18.6%19801981: +4.5%1982: +28.6%1983: +18.3%1984: +9.7%1985: +28.6%1986: +17.0%1987: -0.7%1988: +14.7%1989: +22.4%1990: -4.8%19901991: +22.3%1992: +5.5%1993: +22.5%1994: -0.7%1995: +19.9%1996: +9.9%1997: +12.3%1998: +8.9%1999: +14.5%2000: +3.8%20002001: -0.4%2002: -3.0%2003: +27.7%2004: +14.8%2005: +10.0%2006: +15.8%2007: +7.8%2008: -19.5%2009: +20.1%2010: +12.9%20102011: -0.7%2012: +12.6%2013: +13.0%2014: +4.8%2015: -1.9%2016: +8.3%2017: +13.9%2018: -6.9%2019: +16.7%2020: +9.5%20202021: +12.6%2022: -13.2%2023: +11.2%2024: +5.9%2025: +16.7%

Any N-year period

Any N-year periodWorst10 % worse thanMedian10 % better thanBest
1 y (1192)−44.4 %−5.8 %+10.2 %+25.5 %+114.5 %
3 y (1168)−26.6 %+0.7 %+9.4 %+16.8 %+33.8 %
5 y (1144)−10.8 %+3.4 %+8.9 %+15.0 %+26.5 %
10 y (1084)−0.1 %+5.4 %+9.1 %+13.6 %+16.7 %
15 y (1024)+2.8 %+6.5 %+9.2 %+13.2 %+16.2 %
20 y (964)+4.3 %+6.9 %+9.6 %+12.5 %+14.4 %
30 y (844)+6.9 %+7.9 %+10.0 %+11.2 %+12.8 %

How it behaved in history

Published results (by others)

What we could not verify

Sources

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Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.