Dalio All Seasons
Ray Dalio's All Seasons (the Tony Robbins / 'All Weather' retail portfolio)
Where it stands today
Our calculation, 1984-02 – 2026-09
Growth of $10,000
Where it came from
The retail portfolio known as 'All Seasons' (also 'All Weather') reached the public in 2014 in Tony Robbins' book 'Money: Master the Game'. Robbins interviewed Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, and the book presented a simple portfolio that Dalio described as a version of his principles that an ordinary investor could hold using index funds. The allocation was 30% stocks, 40% long-term Treasuries, 15% intermediate Treasuries, 7.5% gold and 7.5% commodities. Dalio did not publish this exact mix in a paper of his own; the public record of it is the book, as repeated and analysed by bloggers (A Wealth of Common Sense, Rational Reminder, 2014).
The idea behind it comes from Bridgewater's All Weather strategy. According to Bridgewater's own history ('The All Weather Story'), the roots go back to 1971, when Dalio, then a young clerk on the New York Stock Exchange, misjudged how markets would react to the end of dollar convertibility to gold. That experience pushed him to study recurring cause-and-effect patterns across economic history instead of trusting intuition. Bridgewater was founded in 1975 as a risk-consulting firm, and from 1987 managed assets for the World Bank pension fund. A 1990 memo to a pension chief argued that asset classes have 'environmental biases' and that low-risk assets such as long bonds can be scaled up to match the risk of equities. Bob Prince, a Bridgewater co-chief investment officer, recalled that Dalio proposed the All Weather idea around 1988-1989 (reported by Business Insider from a Bridgewater video).
The framework divides economic conditions into four environments: growth rising or falling, and inflation rising or falling, each relative to what markets expect. All Weather aims to hold an equal amount of risk for each environment, so that the portfolio does not need a forecast. Because bonds are far less volatile than equities, the real strategy scales low-risk assets up with leverage so that each building block contributes similar risk. Bridgewater says All Weather was formalised in 1996 as a pilot for Dalio's family trust, not initially as a product. In the early 2000s, after the dot-com crash, outside pension clients began adopting it (the Bridgewater history names a US pension CIO who allocated 200 million dollars).
The term 'risk parity' did not come from Bridgewater. Edward Qian of PanAgora Asset Management used it in a 2005 white paper, and the label was applied to the whole category in 2008, after the financial crisis drew attention to the approach (Wikipedia, 'Risk parity'; Bridgewater history). Bridgewater is credited with the first risk-parity product.
The Robbins version differs from the real All Weather in important ways. It uses no leverage, so total risk is dominated by the 55% in bonds and by stocks rather than being equalised across the four environments. It is a fixed mix of five index-type holdings rebalanced by the investor, whereas Bridgewater's fund uses futures, swaps, inflation-linked bonds, global markets and a risk model, and runs at a risk target that is set separately. Commentators noted that the Robbins mix is more like a variation of Harry Browne's Permanent Portfolio than a copy of All Weather. The allocation was also back-tested over the period 1984-2013, which coincided with a 30-year bond bull market, so the headline numbers in the book flatter the mix (Carlson, Rational Reminder).
What is in it
| Stocks (S&P 500 type index fund) | 30% | |
| Long-term Treasuries (20-25 year) | 40% | |
| Intermediate Treasuries (7-10 year) | 15% | |
| Gold | 7.5% | |
| Commodities | 7.5% |
How we model it
| Long-term government bonds (20+ y) | 40% |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 30% |
| Intermediate government bonds (10 y) | 15% |
| Gold | 7.5% |
| Commodities | 7.5% |
For a euro investor
How to build it with European funds
| Part | Share | Example funds (ISIN) |
|---|---|---|
| Long-term government bonds (20+ y) | 40% | iShares USD Treasury Bond 20+yr UCITS ETF USD (Dist) IE00BSKRJZ44 |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 30% | iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09 |
| Intermediate government bonds (10 y) | 15% | iShares USD Treasury Bond 7-10yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B1FZS798 |
| Gold | 7.5% | Invesco Physical Gold ETC IE00B579F325Xetra-Gold DE000A0S9GB0 |
| Commodities | 7.5% | iShares Diversified Commodity Swap UCITS ETF IE00BDFL4P12 |
The idea
Dalio's idea is that no one can forecast growth and inflation, so the portfolio should hold assets that each do well in one of four environments (growth up or down, inflation up or down) and balance the risk between them. In the retail version stocks serve rising growth, long and intermediate Treasuries serve falling growth and falling inflation, and gold and commodities serve rising inflation. Dalio's own comment in the book was that this should hold up in any season.
How people buy it
Retail ETF mapping from A Wealth of Common Sense / Rational Reminder style write-ups: a total stock or S&P 500 fund (for example VTI or VOO) for 30%, a long Treasury fund (for example VGLT or TLT) for 40%, an intermediate Treasury fund (for example IEF or BIV) for 15%, a gold ETF (for example GLD) for 7.5%, and a broad commodity fund (for example DBC or USCI) for 7.5%. These fund names are common examples from third-party sources, not recommendations from Dalio.
Rebalancing as published
Not specified in the sources found. Third-party write-ups commonly assume periodic (annual) rebalancing; Robbins' text on frequency was not verified.
Variants
- Bridgewater's real All Weather: leveraged, risk-balanced across four environments, uses inflation-linked bonds and global markets, with an unpublished exact mix.
- One repost (Seeitmarket) shows 5% gold and 5% commodities; it looks like a transcription error, since other sources say 7.5% each.
- Risk-parity ETFs and funds (for example RPAR, ALLW-type products and AQR risk parity) as an easier route to the leveraged idea; these were not verified in this research.
- Permanent Portfolio (Harry Browne): 25% each stocks, long bonds, gold and cash, often mentioned as the closest simple relative.
Criticism
- The book's headline back-test (1984-2013) fell inside the longest bond bull market in history; Carlson called the last 30 years 'hugely misleading' for bond-heavy mixes (A Wealth of Common Sense).
- Starting yields on long Treasuries were far higher in 1984 than in the 2010s, so future returns from a 55% bond mix are likely lower (Rational Reminder, 2014).
- Robbins mentioned a 75-year back-test but, according to Carlson, did not publish it.
- Without leverage the retail mix is not risk-balanced: stocks and long bonds still dominate risk, so it is not the real All Weather (see origin).
- Rational Reminder criticises the book's story-driven style, the 'risk a little, make a lot' tone and the claim of low risk with high return; the author argues volatility should be managed with fixed income, not magic allocations.
- Real-return concern: commentators on the Carlson post noted that a bond-heavy mix with 7.5% each in gold and commodities delivers modest real return in inflationary decades.
Through the eras
| Era | Dates | Total | Per year | Worst drop | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black Monday | 1987-08 – 1987-12 | −5.7 % | — | −9.8 % | −21.8 % |
| Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession | 1990-07 – 1991-03 | +8.4 % | — | −3.6 % | +7.4 % |
| 1994 bond market massacre | 1994-02 – 1994-12 | −6.0 % | — | −8.0 % | −3.2 % |
| Asian and Russian financial crises | 1997-07 – 1998-10 | +20.3 % | +14.8 % | −4.1 % | +22.4 % |
| Dot-com bubble and crash | 2000-03 – 2002-10 | +7.7 % | +2.8 % | −5.1 % | −37.2 % |
| Recovery and housing boom | 2002-11 – 2007-09 | +65.1 % | +10.7 % | −5.3 % | +97.0 % |
| Global financial crisis | 2007-10 – 2009-03 | −0.2 % | −0.1 % | −12.1 % | −44.7 % |
| The decade after the crisis | 2009-04 – 2019-12 | +143.6 % | +8.6 % | −6.5 % | +411.2 % |
| Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off | 2018-09 – 2018-12 | −4.9 % | — | −4.9 % | −14.4 % |
| Covid crash and stimulus boom | 2020-02 – 2021-12 | +21.6 % | +10.8 % | −4.6 % | +53.6 % |
| Inflation shock and rate hikes | 2022-01 – 2022-12 | −19.6 % | −19.6 % | −21.7 % | −19.9 % |
Calendar years
Any N-year period
| Any N-year period | Worst | 10 % worse than | Median | 10 % better than | Best |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 y (501) | −21.0 % | −0.4 % | +10.0 % | +18.4 % | +42.6 % |
| 3 y (477) | −3.6 % | +4.1 % | +9.1 % | +13.7 % | +23.7 % |
| 5 y (453) | +1.9 % | +4.7 % | +8.7 % | +12.3 % | +17.8 % |
| 10 y (393) | +4.1 % | +5.5 % | +8.8 % | +11.7 % | +13.2 % |
| 15 y (333) | +5.8 % | +6.6 % | +8.6 % | +10.2 % | +13.0 % |
| 20 y (273) | +6.6 % | +7.1 % | +8.9 % | +10.1 % | +11.5 % |
| 30 y (153) | +7.2 % | +7.7 % | +8.9 % | +10.0 % | +10.7 % |
How it behaved in history
- 1928-1983 (pre-gold, pre-commodity proxy). Carlson used a 35/65 stock/bond proxy because gold and commodity data were lacking; it returned about 5.8% a year nominally, with inflation taking a large bite in the 1953-1983 rising-rate period (Pieter Tobback's figure of 6.71% for 1953-1983 nominal). awealthofcommonsense.com
- 1984-2013 (bond bull market). Strong results driven by falling yields; the book's 9.7% figure covers this window. awealthofcommonsense.com
- 2008 financial crisis. No published 2008 result for the Robbins mix was found. A commenter reported the Permanent Portfolio lost 0.7% in 2008, a related mix. Risk-parity funds as a category lost less than balanced funds. en.wikipedia.org
- 2013 taper tantrum. Bond prices fell sharply in 2013; risk-parity mutual funds lost about 6.75% in the first half. A bond-heavy unlevered mix would also have been hurt. en.wikipedia.org
- 2020 COVID sell-off. Shifts in correlations caused risk-parity underperformance in Q1 2020 (Wikipedia, citation needed). en.wikipedia.org
Published results (by others)
- Robbins reported annual return of 9.7%, volatility 7.6%, worst year -3.9%, and only four down years in 30 years (1984-2013): CAGR 9.7%, SD 7.6%, worst -3.9%, 86% positive years awealthofcommonsense.com
- Carlson's own longer test reported similar results (1972-2013): CAGR 9.5%, volatility 7.9%, largest loss -4.2% awealthofcommonsense.com
- Independent back-test by Rational Reminder using S&P 500 and 20-25 year Treasuries (1984-2014): CAGR 9.87%, standard deviation 7.19% rationalreminder.ca
- Carlson's proxy 35/65 stock/bond mix shows how much the bond bull market added (1928-1983 vs 1984-2013): 5.8% vs 9.8% annualised, SD about 8.5-8.7% awealthofcommonsense.com
- Risk parity funds fell in the 2008 crisis but less than a conventional balanced fund (AQR risk parity -18 to -19% vs Vanguard Balanced Index -22%); this is about the category, not the Robbins mix (2008): -18% to -19% vs -22% en.wikipedia.org
- Risk-parity mutual funds lost about 6.75% in the first half of 2013 as bond prices fell in the taper tantrum (category, not the Robbins mix) (H1 2013): -6.75% en.wikipedia.org
What we could not verify
- The book itself was not read; weights come from secondary sources that agree with each other.
- Robbins' rebalancing rule was not found.
- Exact Bridgewater All Weather holdings and leverage are not public; fund-level performance figures found were contradictory (9.5% vs 7.5% annualised since 1996) and are not recorded as evidence.
- The 1988-1989 'idea' date comes from a recollection in a Bridgewater video reported by Business Insider; the Bridgewater PDF text could not be extracted.
- Bogleheads wiki page returned 403, so its summary is missing.
Sources
- awealthofcommonsense.com
https://awealthofcommonsense.com/?p=7038 - rationalreminder.ca
https://rationalreminder.ca/blog/2014/11/21/stories-over-science-tony-robbins-financial-advice - www.bridgewater.com
https://www.bridgewater.com/research-and-insights/the-all-weather-story - www.bridgewater.com
https://www.bridgewater.com/resources/all-weather-story.pdf - en.wikipedia.org
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_parity - en.wikipedia.org
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Dalio - www.businessinsider.in
https://www.businessinsider.in/the-unlikely-history-behind-one-of-wall-streets-iconic-funds/articleshow/53936264.cms - www.whitecoatinvestor.com
https://www.whitecoatinvestor.com/criticizing-the-all-weather-portfolio/
Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.