Armstrong Ideal Index
Frank Armstrong Ideal Index Portfolio
Where it stands today
Our calculation, 1926-07 – 2026-09
Growth of $10,000
Where it came from
Frank Armstrong III is a fee-only investment adviser who founded Investor Solutions, Inc., a registered advisory firm in Coconut Grove, Florida, in 1993. He describes a seven-fund 'Ideal Index' portfolio in his book 'The Informed Investor: A Hype-Free Guide to Constructing a Sound Financial Portfolio' (American Management Association). Sources date the book to 2002 (a library listing), 2003 (Seeking Alpha) or a 2004 paperback; the portfolio is dated 2002 in the Portfolio Charts and Bogleheads write-ups.
The portfolio is built from modern portfolio theory ideas: broad diversification across US stocks sliced by size and value, a large share of foreign stocks, a small REIT position and a short-term bond sleeve. It is 70% equity-like assets and 30% fixed income. Portfolio Charts describes it as similar in spirit to Bill Bernstein's Coward's Portfolio: sliced US stocks, a healthy allocation to short-term bonds and a dash of REITs. It has one of the largest international allocations among the lazy portfolios on that site, and a stock tilt slightly towards value.
The Portfolio Charts site added the portfolio in September 2017 and notes that it rounded Armstrong's numbers to fit its tools (31 / 30 / 9 / 9 / 8 / 7 / 6 in the displayed version). Several sites (Bogleheads blog, Lazy Portfolio ETF, Optimized Portfolio) quote the finer weights 31% / 30% / 9.25% / 9.25% / 8% / 6.25% / 6.25%. I could not open the book, so the weights are taken from these secondary but mutually consistent sources.
Armstrong's own fund choices in the book were Vanguard index funds as reported by a secondary summary: VISVX (small value), VIVAX (value), VISGX (small growth), VFINX (S&P 500), VGTSX (total international), VGSIX (REIT) and VBISX (short-term bond). Modern ETF versions use IJS, VTV, IJT, VV, VEU, VNQ and SHY.
What is in it
| International large-cap stocks (ex-US) | 31% | VGTSX in the book per a secondary summary; VEU in ETF versions |
| US short-term bonds / Treasuries | 30% | VBISX; SHY in ETF versions |
| US large-cap value | 9.2% | VIVAX; VTV |
| US small-cap value | 9.2% | VISVX; IJS |
| US REITs | 8% | VGSIX; VNQ |
| US large-cap blend | 6.2% | VFINX; VV |
| US small-cap growth | 6.2% | VISGX; IJT |
How we model it
| Developed markets outside the US | 31% |
| Short-term government bonds | 30% |
| US large value stocks | 9.2% |
| US small value stocks | 9.2% |
| Real estate (REITs) | 8% |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 6.2% |
| US small companies | 6.2% |
For a euro investor
How to build it with European funds
| Part | Share | Example funds (ISIN) |
|---|---|---|
| Developed markets outside the US (closest match) | 31% | iShares Core MSCI Europe UCITS ETF EUR (Acc) IE00B4K48X80iShares Core MSCI Japan IMI UCITS ETF IE00B4L5YX21 |
| Short-term government bonds | 30% | iShares USD Treasury Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4S71iShares Euro Government Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4Q57 |
| US large value stocks | 9.2% | iShares Edge MSCI USA Value Factor UCITS ETF IE00BD1F4M44 |
| US small value stocks | 9.2% | SPDR MSCI USA Small Cap Value Weighted UCITS ETF IE00BSPLC413 |
| Real estate (REITs) | 8% | iShares US Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZSF77iShares Developed Markets Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZS350 |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 6.2% | iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09 |
| US small companies | 6.2% | SPDR Russell 2000 U.S. Small Cap UCITS ETF IE00BJ38QD84iShares MSCI USA Small Cap ESG Enhanced CTB UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B3VWM098 |
The idea
Spread risk over the whole equity market with tilts to value and small caps, keep a large foreign sleeve, add a little REIT diversification and hold the safe part in short-term bonds so that interest-rate risk stays low. Index funds are used throughout because active management rarely earns its extra cost (the author's stated view in reviews of his book).
How people buy it
Seven index funds. In the book (per a secondary summary): Vanguard funds VISVX, VIVAX, VISGX, VFINX, VGTSX, VGSIX, VBISX. ETF versions: IJS, VTV, IJT, VV, VEU, VNQ, SHY.
Rebalancing as published
Not found: none of the secondary sources I read gives Armstrong's rebalancing rule.
Variants
- Portfolio Charts rounded version: 31 international, 30 short-term Treasuries, 9 large value, 9 small value, 8 REIT, 7 large blend, 6 small growth.
- M1 Finance pie in the Optimized Portfolio review rounds to whole percentages because fractional slices are not allowed.
Criticism
- The Optimized Portfolio author questions the small-cap growth slice and the 30% short-term bond sleeve (his opinion, not Armstrong's).
- A backtest in that review showed a lower Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500 over its period, with about one-third lower volatility.
- Seven funds and fractional weights make it harder to maintain than a three-fund portfolio.
Through the eras
| Era | Dates | Total | Per year | Worst drop | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roaring Twenties boom | 1926-07 – 1929-08 | +91.9 % | +22.9 % | −5.0 % | +153.7 % |
| Wall Street crash and Great Contraction | 1929-09 – 1932-07 | −62.5 % | −28.5 % | −71.0 % | −78.2 % |
| New Deal recovery | 1932-08 – 1937-02 | +212.9 % | +28.3 % | −31.6 % | +268.7 % |
| Recession within the Depression | 1937-03 – 1938-03 | −42.4 % | −39.9 % | −43.2 % | −49.5 % |
| Rearmament and World War II | 1938-04 – 1945-09 | +183.6 % | +14.9 % | −20.6 % | +205.8 % |
| Postwar expansion | 1945-10 – 1965-12 | +783.9 % | +11.4 % | −19.8 % | +1212.9 % |
| Golden age of the 1950s | 1950-01 – 1959-12 | +298.7 % | +14.8 % | −12.6 % | +438.8 % |
| Go-go years and nifty-fifty | 1966-01 – 1968-12 | +44.6 % | +13.1 % | −11.4 % | +34.0 % |
| The Great Inflation (stagflation) | 1969-01 – 1982-07 | +172.4 % | +7.7 % | −27.8 % | +84.6 % |
| 1973-74 oil shock and bear market | 1973-01 – 1974-12 | −25.4 % | −13.6 % | −27.7 % | −41.7 % |
| Second oil shock and the Volcker disinflation | 1979-01 – 1982-08 | +68.9 % | +15.4 % | −10.6 % | +59.2 % |
| Great bull market in stocks and bonds | 1982-08 – 1999-12 | +856.6 % | +13.8 % | −20.7 % | +2060.4 % |
| Black Monday | 1987-08 – 1987-12 | −15.4 % | — | −20.7 % | −21.8 % |
| Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession | 1990-07 – 1991-03 | +2.5 % | — | −13.1 % | +7.4 % |
| 1994 bond market massacre | 1994-02 – 1994-12 | −2.1 % | — | −4.4 % | −3.2 % |
| Asian and Russian financial crises | 1997-07 – 1998-10 | +7.5 % | +5.6 % | −11.1 % | +22.4 % |
| Dot-com bubble and crash | 2000-03 – 2002-10 | −7.2 % | −2.8 % | −13.7 % | −37.2 % |
| Recovery and housing boom | 2002-11 – 2007-09 | +110.7 % | +16.4 % | −5.1 % | +97.0 % |
| Global financial crisis | 2007-10 – 2009-03 | −36.0 % | −25.7 % | −40.4 % | −44.7 % |
| The decade after the crisis | 2009-04 – 2019-12 | +176.4 % | +9.9 % | −15.8 % | +411.2 % |
| Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off | 2018-09 – 2018-12 | −10.3 % | — | −10.3 % | −14.4 % |
| Covid crash and stimulus boom | 2020-02 – 2021-12 | +27.4 % | +13.5 % | −17.2 % | +53.6 % |
| Inflation shock and rate hikes | 2022-01 – 2022-12 | −10.4 % | −10.4 % | −17.2 % | −19.9 % |
Calendar years
Any N-year period
| Any N-year period | Worst | 10 % worse than | Median | 10 % better than | Best |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 y (1192) | −51.6 % | −7.3 % | +11.2 % | +28.5 % | +144.7 % |
| 3 y (1168) | −31.8 % | −0.5 % | +10.1 % | +18.4 % | +38.7 % |
| 5 y (1144) | −14.1 % | +2.5 % | +9.5 % | +16.6 % | +30.5 % |
| 10 y (1084) | −1.8 % | +5.5 % | +9.8 % | +14.6 % | +18.0 % |
| 15 y (1024) | +2.0 % | +6.1 % | +9.8 % | +13.7 % | +17.3 % |
| 20 y (964) | +4.0 % | +6.7 % | +10.4 % | +13.1 % | +14.8 % |
| 30 y (844) | +7.0 % | +7.9 % | +10.8 % | +11.9 % | +13.3 % |
How it behaved in history
- 2007-2009. Lazy Portfolio ETF shows the deepest drawdown from November 2007 to February 2009 (-40.11%, nominal), with recovery in February 2011. The Optimized Portfolio review mentions that REITs fell sharply in the 2008 crisis. www.lazyportfolioetf.com
- 1970-2025 overall. Portfolio Charts reports a deepest real-terms drawdown of 36% and a longest time under water of 8 years in its table (the text says under 8 years). portfoliocharts.com
Published results (by others)
- Portfolio Charts: US investor, 1970-2025, average real return 6.1%, deepest drawdown 36% (real), volatility 11.6%, 30-year safe withdrawal rate 4.9% (1970-2025): 6.1% real return; 36% deepest loss; 11.6% volatility; 4.9% SWR (30 yr) portfoliocharts.com
- Lazy Portfolio ETF: nominal CAGR 9.31%, real 5.17%; maximum drawdown -40.11% from November 2007 to February 2009, recovered February 2011; worst rolling 12-month return -34.14% (January 1970 to September 2026): CAGR 9.31%; max drawdown -40.11% www.lazyportfolioetf.com
What we could not verify
- The book itself was not read: the weights come from four secondary sources that agree with each other, and the 2002/2003/2004 publication date differs by source.
- The Vanguard fund list for the book comes from one secondary summary (the myplaniq.com page could not be opened by me, only the search snippet).
- Armstrong's rebalancing rule not found.
- Whether the book's international fund included emerging markets is not confirmed; the ETF version VEU does.
- Returns quoted come from calculators that use fund or ETF proxies for early years; they are not Armstrong's own results.
Sources
- www.optimizedportfolio.com
https://www.optimizedportfolio.com/ideal-index-portfolio/ - www.lazyportfolioetf.com
https://www.lazyportfolioetf.com/allocation/frank-armstrong-ideal-index/ - portfoliocharts.com
https://portfoliocharts.com/portfolios/ideal-index-portfolio/ - portfoliocharts.com
https://portfoliocharts.com/2017/09/02/the-ideal-index-portfolio-and-the-many-paths-to-perfection - mymoneyblog.com
https://mymoneyblog.com/book_review_the_3.html - seekingalpha.com
https://seekingalpha.com/article/3028296-kiss-retirement-portfolio-frank-armstrongs-ideal-index-portfolio - www.bogleheads.org
https://www.bogleheads.org/blog/2023/01/10/frank-armstrong-ideal-index-portfolio-2022-update/
Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.