Alaska Permanent Fund
Alaska Permanent Fund policy (target) asset allocation, Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, FY27 targets effective 1 July 2026
Where it stands today
Our calculation, 1926-07 – 2026-09
Growth of $10,000
Where it came from
The Alaska Permanent Fund is a state-owned savings fund created from oil revenue. APFC's 2026 mid-year review traces it to a first deposit of $734 thousand, which has grown to about $86.3 billion, in a year it calls the fund's 50th (source: APFC mid fiscal year review 2026). The fund is run by APFC, a public corporation whose Board of Trustees sets the asset allocation, while staff pick the investments within it (APFC board release, May 2024). The statutory goal quoted in the 2009 annual report is the maximum return while protecting principal, and the Board sets an allocation meant to earn about a 5% real return over time with prudent risk (2009 annual report).
The fund has two accounts: the principal, which is protected, and the Earnings Reserve, from which the State of Alaska draws under the Percent of Market Value (POMV) rule, at most 5% of the average fund value. In FY25 APFC transferred $3.7 billion to the State, and the FY26 draw commitment is $3.8 billion (APFC 2025 annual report press release). The Board chair says more than 60% of the state budget now depends on the fund, which is why the long-term return objective (CPI plus 5%) and liquidity matter for the allocation.
Old framework. For fiscal 2009 the target allocation was a plain stock/bond/alternatives table: US stocks 26%, US bonds 19%, global stocks 14%, non-US stocks 13%, real estate 10%, absolute return 6%, private equity 6% (read from the pie chart in the 2009 annual report; these seven add up to 94% and the remaining 6% could not be read from the extracted text). The same report says the Trustees adopted a new framework in May 2009, effective 1 July 2009 (FY2010), grouping assets by the economic conditions they address instead of by market. The investments did not change, only how they were observed.
Current framework. Today the fund describes eight asset classes: public equities, fixed income, private equity, real estate, private income, absolute return, tactical opportunities and cash. The Board adopted the FY25 targets effective 1 July 2024: public equities 32%, fixed income 20%, private equity 18% (+3), real estate 11% (-2), private income 10% (+1), absolute return 7%, tactical 1% (-1), cash 1% (-1) (APFC release, May 2024). The implied FY24 targets, from the changes printed in that release, were 32/20/15/13/9/7/2/2. The FY26 targets were kept unchanged (APFC 2025 annual report press release, which lists the same class weights).
Latest. At its meeting of 26-27 May 2026 the Board adopted the FY27 targets effective 1 July 2026: public equities 34% (+2), fixed income 20%, private equity 17% (-1), real estate 10% (-1), private income 9% (-1), absolute return 8% (+1), tactical opportunities 1%, cash 1%, total 100% (APFC Q3 board meeting press release, 28 May 2026). So the Board is moving a little from illiquid assets into liquid public equities and absolute return. This file uses these FY27 targets as the 'latest published' allocation. The policy is reviewed every fiscal year and staff may deviate within bands, so the fund's actual mix and the targets differ.
What is in it
| Public equities | 34% | FY27 target (from 1 Jul 2026); was 32% in FY24-FY26 |
| Fixed income | 20% | unchanged FY24-FY27 |
| Private equity | 17% | FY27; 18% in FY25-FY26; implied 15% in FY24 |
| Real estate | 10% | FY27; 11% in FY25-FY26; implied 13% in FY24 |
| Private income | 9% | FY27; 10% in FY25-FY26; implied 9% in FY24. APFC mentions infrastructure (power, digital) in this class |
| Absolute return | 8% | FY27; 7% in FY24-FY26 |
| Tactical opportunities | 1% | FY27; 1% since FY25 |
| Cash | 1% | FY27; 1% since FY25 |
How we model it
| US bond market (aggregate) | 20% |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 19.4% |
| US small companies | 18% |
| Real estate (REITs) | 14% |
| Developed markets outside the US | 12% |
| Short-term government bonds | 5.6% |
| Emerging markets | 5% |
| Corporate bonds | 5% |
| Cash (Treasury bills) | 1% |
For a euro investor
How to build it with European funds
| Part | Share | Example funds (ISIN) |
|---|---|---|
| US bond market (aggregate) (closest match) | 20% | iShares Core Global Aggregate Bond UCITS ETF EUR Hedged (Acc) IE00BDBRDM35iShares Core Global Aggregate Bond UCITS ETF USD (Dist) IE00B3F81409 |
| US large companies (S&P 500) | 19.4% | iShares Core S&P 500 UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B5BMR087Vanguard S&P 500 UCITS ETF (USD) Distributing IE00B3XXRP09 |
| US small companies | 18% | SPDR Russell 2000 U.S. Small Cap UCITS ETF IE00BJ38QD84iShares MSCI USA Small Cap ESG Enhanced CTB UCITS ETF USD (Acc) IE00B3VWM098 |
| Real estate (REITs) | 14% | iShares US Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZSF77iShares Developed Markets Property Yield UCITS ETF IE00B1FZS350 |
| Developed markets outside the US (closest match) | 12% | iShares Core MSCI Europe UCITS ETF EUR (Acc) IE00B4K48X80iShares Core MSCI Japan IMI UCITS ETF IE00B4L5YX21 |
| Short-term government bonds | 5.6% | iShares USD Treasury Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4S71iShares Euro Government Bond 1-3yr UCITS ETF (Dist) IE00B14X4Q57 |
| Emerging markets | 5% | iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets IMI UCITS ETF (Acc) IE00BKM4GZ66 |
| Corporate bonds | 5% | iShares USD Corporate Bond UCITS ETF (Dist) IE0032895942 |
| Cash (Treasury bills) | 1% | Xtrackers II EUR Overnight Rate Swap UCITS ETF 1C LU0290358497iShares USD Treasury Bond 0-1yr UCITS ETF (Acc) IE00BGSF1X88 |
The idea
A sovereign endowment-style fund that must pay a 5% yearly draw to the State, keep up with inflation (CPI plus 5% objective) and avoid permanent loss. APFC describes each class by role: public equities as the largest return driver, fixed income for income and liquidity, private equity for higher long-term return, real estate for income and inflation protection, private income for steady income, absolute return for uncorrelated returns, tactical for flexible opportunities, cash for liquidity (APFC mid-year review 2026).
How people buy it
Not replicable by individuals: APFC invests through external managers, direct real estate, private partnerships, co-investments and an internal team (including internally managed fixed income announced for savings, per APFC FY22 review). Public proxies: global equity index funds, small-cap fund, REIT and infrastructure funds, aggregate bond and short bond funds.
Rebalancing as published
The Board reviews the Investment Policy Statement and the asset allocation every fiscal year; staff may deviate within bands around each target (APFC May 2024 release). Rebalancing frequency inside bands is not stated in the documents I read.
Variants
- FY2009 targets: US stocks 26, US bonds 19, global stocks 14, non-US stocks 13, real estate 10, absolute return 6, private equity 6 (94% read; rest not read).
- FY24 implied targets: 32/20/15/13/9/7/2/2 (public equities, fixed income, PE, RE, private income, absolute return, tactical, cash).
- FY25-FY26 targets: 32/20/18/11/10/7/1/1.
- Compare m_calpers, m_gic, m_cpp, m_norway (other sovereign / public funds) and m_stanford, m_harvard (endowments).
Criticism
- Large illiquid share (private equity, real estate, private income, tactical about 37% in FY27) with lagged valuations, so reported volatility is understated.
- Policy is changed every year, so there is no stable 'model portfolio'; the FY27 table is a snapshot.
- In FY25 private equity returned 4.13% against 9.35% for the whole fund, and real estate returned 1.57% (APFC 2025 release): private classes lagged in that year.
- Return can fall below the CPI plus 5% objective in bad years (FY22 and FY09 did).
Through the eras
| Era | Dates | Total | Per year | Worst drop | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roaring Twenties boom | 1926-07 – 1929-08 | +87.4 % | +21.9 % | −4.8 % | +153.7 % |
| Wall Street crash and Great Contraction | 1929-09 – 1932-07 | −61.5 % | −27.9 % | −69.5 % | −78.2 % |
| New Deal recovery | 1932-08 – 1937-02 | +224.9 % | +29.3 % | −27.9 % | +268.7 % |
| Recession within the Depression | 1937-03 – 1938-03 | −40.5 % | −38.1 % | −41.0 % | −49.5 % |
| Rearmament and World War II | 1938-04 – 1945-09 | +184.2 % | +14.9 % | −18.2 % | +205.8 % |
| Postwar expansion | 1945-10 – 1965-12 | +717.6 % | +10.9 % | −19.7 % | +1212.9 % |
| Golden age of the 1950s | 1950-01 – 1959-12 | +274.5 % | +14.1 % | −10.9 % | +438.8 % |
| Go-go years and nifty-fifty | 1966-01 – 1968-12 | +43.6 % | +12.8 % | −11.9 % | +34.0 % |
| The Great Inflation (stagflation) | 1969-01 – 1982-07 | +138.8 % | +6.6 % | −31.1 % | +84.6 % |
| 1973-74 oil shock and bear market | 1973-01 – 1974-12 | −28.3 % | −15.3 % | −31.0 % | −41.7 % |
| Second oil shock and the Volcker disinflation | 1979-01 – 1982-08 | +60.9 % | +13.8 % | −11.3 % | +59.2 % |
| Great bull market in stocks and bonds | 1982-08 – 1999-12 | +972.3 % | +14.6 % | −20.3 % | +2060.4 % |
| Black Monday | 1987-08 – 1987-12 | −15.0 % | — | −20.3 % | −21.8 % |
| Savings-and-loan crisis and 1990 recession | 1990-07 – 1991-03 | +5.6 % | — | −12.4 % | +7.4 % |
| 1994 bond market massacre | 1994-02 – 1994-12 | −3.1 % | — | −4.5 % | −3.2 % |
| Asian and Russian financial crises | 1997-07 – 1998-10 | +5.0 % | +3.8 % | −13.5 % | +22.4 % |
| Dot-com bubble and crash | 2000-03 – 2002-10 | −7.4 % | −2.9 % | −12.3 % | −37.2 % |
| Recovery and housing boom | 2002-11 – 2007-09 | +108.9 % | +16.2 % | −4.8 % | +97.0 % |
| Global financial crisis | 2007-10 – 2009-03 | −34.5 % | −24.6 % | −39.4 % | −44.7 % |
| The decade after the crisis | 2009-04 – 2019-12 | +231.1 % | +11.8 % | −13.5 % | +411.2 % |
| Fourth-quarter 2018 sell-off | 2018-09 – 2018-12 | −10.1 % | — | −10.1 % | −14.4 % |
| Covid crash and stimulus boom | 2020-02 – 2021-12 | +30.8 % | +15.1 % | −15.9 % | +53.6 % |
| Inflation shock and rate hikes | 2022-01 – 2022-12 | −16.8 % | −16.8 % | −21.3 % | −19.9 % |
Calendar years
Any N-year period
| Any N-year period | Worst | 10 % worse than | Median | 10 % better than | Best |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 y (1192) | −49.9 % | −7.3 % | +11.4 % | +27.9 % | +139.1 % |
| 3 y (1168) | −30.7 % | −0.3 % | +10.4 % | +18.1 % | +40.0 % |
| 5 y (1144) | −13.3 % | +3.0 % | +9.8 % | +16.2 % | +30.9 % |
| 10 y (1084) | −0.6 % | +5.9 % | +9.9 % | +14.3 % | +17.6 % |
| 15 y (1024) | +2.8 % | +7.0 % | +9.8 % | +13.7 % | +16.9 % |
| 20 y (964) | +4.5 % | +7.4 % | +10.2 % | +13.1 % | +15.0 % |
| 30 y (844) | +7.7 % | +8.5 % | +10.5 % | +11.8 % | +13.6 % |
How it behaved in history
- 2008-2009 financial crisis. APFC's worst result by then: -18% in FY2009, with unrealized losses reaching $6.5 billion during the year and the fund ending the year at $30 billion; US stock portfolio -24.8%, global stock portfolio -31.4%. The Board then changed to a new allocation framework from FY2010. The FY2008 return was not collected. apfc.org
- 2022. Total fund -1.32% in FY2022, the first negative year since 2012 according to news coverage; it missed the CPI+5% objective in a year of record inflation, but beat all three long-run benchmarks over 5, 10 and 20 years. apfc.org
- 2024-2026 targets. The Board raised private equity and private income in 2024, kept targets in 2025 citing uncertainty, and in May 2026 moved 2 points into public equities and 1 into absolute return. apfc.org
Published results (by others)
- FY2025 total fund return vs benchmark and objective (FY2025 (to 30 Jun 2025)): +9.35% vs benchmark 9.29% and CPI+5% objective 7.67%; 10-year annualised 8.08%; fund value $85.1 billion apfc.org
- Largest loss in the fund's history to that date (FY2009 (to 30 Jun 2009)): -18% total return vs composite benchmark -16.7%; fund value ended at $30 billion apfc.org
- Return in the 2022 inflation and bond sell-off (FY2022 (to 30 Jun 2022)): -1.32%; fund value $76.3 billion, down from $81.9 billion in FY21 apfc.org
- Asset class returns in FY25 (FY2025): public equities +16.09%, fixed income +6.67%, private equity +4.13% (10-year 13.70%), private income +11.50%, absolute return +10.19%, real estate +1.57%, cash +4.65% apfc.org
What we could not verify
- The APFC asset-allocation web page (apfc.org/asset-allocation) returned 404 and the Business Wire copy returned 403; the FY27 table was verified from APFC's own PDF release instead.
- FY24 targets (32/20/15/13/9/7/2/2) are derived by me from the changes printed in the May 2024 release, not read from a table. A search summary of Dakota/Buyouts Insider gave conflicting FY24 figures (e.g. public equities 34%, private equity 16-17%); not resolved.
- FY26 targets: the 2025 annual report press release prints the same class weights as FY25 (32/20/18/10/7/11/1/1) and a search summary says the Board kept targets; I did not open the May 2025 release itself (blocked).
- FY2009 target pie chart: only 94% of the weights could be read from extracted PDF text; the rest is unknown. FY2008 return not collected; the starting fund value of FY2009 was not collected.
- Regional split of public equities, equity beta of absolute return and the make-up of private income are my assumptions; APFC does not publish them in the documents I read.
- Benchmark and 'passive index' figures in the 2026 mid-year review (e.g. 6.63% return, 10-year 9.02%) have unclear periods in the extracted text and are not used.
Sources
- apfc.org
https://apfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/202605_Q3-Board-Meeting-Press-Release-1.pdf - apfc.org
https://apfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/202405_APFC-Board-of-Trustees-Quarterly-Meeting-News-Release.pdf - apfc.org
https://apfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/202509_Annual-Report-Press-Release.pdf - apfc.org
https://apfc.org/download/12/annual-reports/618/2009-apfc-annual-report.pdf - apfc.org
https://apfc.org/download/184/mid-fiscal-year-reviews/7131/apfc-2026-mid-fiscal-year-review.pdf - apfc.org
https://apfc.org/?p=3806 - www.businesswire.com
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250530619939/en/APFC-Board-Examines-Asset-Allocation-Approves-Targeted-Portfolio-Adjustments - www.dakota.com
https://www.dakota.com/fundraising-news/alaska-permanent-increasing-target-to-private-equity-real-estate-private-income
Calculated on historical data. Past results do not predict the future. Models before the 1990s use stand-ins for classes that had no index yet; fees, taxes and fund costs are not included. This is mathematics, not an investment recommendation.